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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3161 
 ___________ 
 
SHANNON BOWMAN, 
           Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SENIOR CORRECTIONAL OFFICER MAZUR; 
DR. DANIEL LEONARD, Clinical Director; 
WARDEN J. YOST 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 08-cv-00173 ) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 9, 2011 
 
 Before:  AMBRO, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed:  July 6, 2011) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant, Shannon Bowman, appeals from the order of the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania entering judgment in favor of 
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appellees and dismissing his complaint.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the 
District Court‟s judgment. 
I. 
Since the facts underlying the instant appeal are well-known to the parties, only a 
summary is provided here.  In August 2008, Bowman, a prisoner currently housed at 
USP-Terre Haute, submitted a complaint in the United States District Court raising a 
claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388 (1971).  Bowman, who is a diabetic, apparently experienced a hypoglycemic 
event (e.g., shaking in bed) on January 2, 2007, while housed in the Segregated Housing 
Unit (“SHU”) at FCI-Loretto.  Corrections Officer Mazur brought food to Bowman‟s cell 
to address his low blood sugar.  Unfortunately, Bowman fell while getting off of the top 
bunk to get the food and injured himself.  Bowman alleges that Officer Mazur, Dr. Daniel 
Leonard, the Clinical Director at FCI-Loretto, and Warden J. Yost (collectively referred 
to as the “BOP Appellees”) ignored the fact that he was medically entitled to a bottom 
bunk, and thus violated his Eighth Amendment right by their deliberate indifference in 
assigning him to a top bunk when he was placed in the SHU on December 21, 2006.  
Bowman claims that he suffered a “severe back injury” as a result of the fall, and sought 
in excess of $2,000,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. 
After the close of discovery, the BOP Appellees filed a motion for summary 
judgment together with a brief and concise statement of material facts in support.  After 
having been granted an extension of time, Bowman filed his response and opposition.  
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The Magistrate Judge to whom the complaint was referred thereafter issued a Report and 
Recommendation that the BOP Appellees‟ motion for summary judgment be granted.  
The Magistrate Judge initially concluded that summary judgment in favor of the BOP 
Appellees was warranted on account of Bowman‟s failure to dispute their statement of 
material facts.  Despite having provided Bowman a directive regarding his need to 
comply with Local Rule 56.1.C.1 and comprehensive instructions on how to go about 
fulfilling that obligation, Bowman nonetheless failed to cite to specific portions of the 
record in support of his responsive concise statement of fact.  The Magistrate Judge thus 
concluded that Bowman failed to create a genuine issue of material fact with respect to 
the  BOP Appellees‟ record evidence that they lacked the deliberate indifference mindset 
required by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994), to make out an Eighth 
Amendment claim. 
The Magistrate Judge further determined that, even accepting Bowman‟s 
statement of material facts and denials as true, the BOP Appellees were nonetheless 
entitled to summary judgment.  The Magistrate Judge concluded that there was no 
evidence in the record to establish the subjective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim 
given Bowman‟s failure to show that defendants knew he had a “lower bunk restriction” 
and/or believed that such a restriction was medically necessary.  
Over Bowman‟s objections, the District Court adopted the Report and 
Recommendation.  The District Court rejected Bowman‟s excuse that a lack of 
understanding of the court‟s  local rules resulted in his deficient response to the BOP 
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Appellees‟ concise statement of material facts.  The court thus found no unfairness in the 
Magistrate Judge‟s recommendation that summary judgment be granted in favor of the 
BOP Appellees based on Bowman‟s failure to comply with Local Rule 56.C., nor did the 
court find any error in the Magistrate Judge‟s alternative merits analysis.  Accordingly, it 
adopted the Report and Recommendation as the opinion of the court, and granted 
summary judgment in favor of the BOP Appellees.  This timely appeal followed. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District 
Court‟s grant of summary judgment is plenary and we must affirm if there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).  “Where the record taken as a 
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 
genuine issue for trial.”  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 
587 (1986).  A genuine issue of material fact is one that could change the outcome of the 
litigation.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
 After a careful review of the record and the parties‟ briefs on appeal, we discern 
no error in the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment in favor of the BOP 
Appellees.  As noted previously, because Bowman failed to file a proper response to the 
BOP Appellees‟ statement of material facts in accordance with the District Court‟s Local 
Rule of Court 56.C, the District Court deemed Appellees‟ statement of material facts to 
be admitted pursuant to its Local Rule of Court 56.E.  We have recognized that such a 
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local rule is permissible so long as the District Court also conducts a merits review and 
renders a finding that judgment for the moving party is “appropriate” in accordance with 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.  See Anchorage Assocs. v. V.I. Bd. of Tax Review, 
922 F.2d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 1990).  Because the District Court conducted a merits analysis 
and Bowman has not challenged this aspect of the District Court‟s decision, we will not 
disturb its decision to deem the BOP Appellees‟ statement of material facts as 
undisputed.
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 This determination is actually of little import in the instant case, however, as we 
agree with the District Court‟s conclusion that, even accepting Bowman‟s responsive 
statements and denials themselves as true, the record in this case is woefully deficient of 
any evidence indicating that the BOP Appellees acted with deliberate indifference in 
assigning him to a top bunk in the RHU.  The principles for establishing a prisoner‟s 
Eighth Amendment claim were established by the Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble, 
429 U.S. 97 (1976), and Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), and require a prisoner 
                                                 
1
     Even affording Bowman‟s filings a liberal construction, we conclude that any such 
challenge has been waived insofar as it has not been so much as mentioned in his pro se 
informal opening brief.  An appellant is “required to set forth the issues raised on appeal 
and to present an argument in support of those issues in [his] opening brief.” Kost v. 
Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993); see Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(5), (9).  “It is 
well settled that an appellant‟s failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening brief 
constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.”  United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 
(3d Cir. 2005).  The instant appeal presents no circumstances which counsel against 
application of that rule.  See, e.g., Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 
2008) (per curiam) (“While we read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally, issues not 
briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
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to allege a sufficiently serious medical need – the objective component – and deliberate 
indifference by prison officials in response to that need – the subjective component. 
The BOP Appellees do not dispute that Bowman‟s insulin-dependent diabetic 
condition amounts to a serious medical need within the meaning of the Eighth 
Amendment, see Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 
2003), and Bowman has been receiving care for that condition during his period of 
incarceration.  The BOP Appellees also do not dispute that a “lower bunk” pass, which 
had been issued back in September 2002 in response to Bowman‟s complaints of frequent 
night-time urination, was eventually located in Bowman‟s medical file during the 
administrative appeal process that subsequently took place.  The record is, however, 
deficient of evidence demonstrating that the BOP Appellees were deliberately indifferent 
to a medical need associated with Bowman‟s diabetic condition when they failed to 
assign him to a lower bunk upon his transfer to the SHU more than four years after the 
issuance of that lower bunk restriction. 
In addition to Dr. Leonard‟s understanding that there is no medical policy 
requiring diabetics to have a bottom bunk assignment and no awareness on his part that 
Bowman‟s diabetic condition made a bottom bunk a medical necessity at the time of the 
January 2007 incident, see Appellees‟ Supp. App. at 73, 85, 100, the BOP Appellees 
stated that Bowman‟s file had been searched upon his request for a lower bunk 
assignment and no such pass was found.  See Supp. App. at 121.  Even if Dr. Leonard 
was negligent in failing to see the possibility that Bowman‟s condition carried with it the 
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need for a bottom bunk assignment in 2006-2007, “[i]t is well-settled that claims of 
negligence or medical malpractice, without some more culpable state of mind, do not 
constitute „deliberate indifference.‟”  Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).  
Additionally, we cannot say that Appellees Mazur and Yost were deliberately indifferent 
to Bowman‟s need for a bottom bunk restriction as a result of, perhaps, their mere 
negligence in searching his prison file, especially where his treating physician was of the 
opinion that no such restriction was medically necessary.  See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 
218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004).  Accordingly, the grant of summary judgment was appropriate.    
III. 
Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the District Court‟s judgment.2 
                                                 
2
   Bowman‟s motion to amend the complaint is denied. 
